This paper analyses the over-indebtedness of microborrowers in Ghana. It defines over-indebtedness from a customer protection perspective and considers borrowers over-indebted if they continuously struggle with repayment and experience unacceptable sacrifices related to their debt. It finds that poorer microborrowers are more likely to be over-indebted. The risk of overindebtedness further increases with the occurrence of adverse economic shocks to a borrower's income or expenses. The likelihood of over-indebtedness is higher for borrowers with low returns on their investment and if borrowers use loans, at least in part, for non-productive purposes. It is higher for borrowers with a low, debt-specific financial literacy. General financial literacy has negative effects on over-indebtedness. We find no effect for mere numeracy. The paper also breaks down the relationship of the above factors to the specific sacrifices that borrowers make, to how frequently they repeat them and to how acceptable sacrifices are to borrowers. 
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Introduction
The literature on consumer finance in developed countries literature has extensively analysed why borrowers enter into burdensome levels of debt and what for what borrowers the risk of personal over-indebtedness is particularly high (Bridges & Disney, 2004; Lea, Webley, & Walker, 1995; Lusardi & Tufano, 2009; Webley & Nyhus, 2001 ). The microfinance industry, which provides financial services to poor populations in developing countries, has only recently become aware of the risk of over-indebtedness. There is a limited amount of research on delinquency and default in microfinance (Godquin, 2004; Schreiner, 2004; Vogelgesang, 2003) , but hardly any research on over-indebtedness. With increasing concerns about negative effects of microfinance on customers, at a time where trust in the positive impact of microfinance is weakening (Duvendack et al., 2011; Karlan & Goldberg, 2011) , overindebtedness is one of the most pressing challenges facing the microfinance industry. It endangers at the same time the sustainability of microfinance institutions (MFIs) and their social impact. The lack of research on over-indebtedness in microfinance thus presents a substantial research gap.
Developing measures to avoid over-indebtedness requires a sound understanding of what drives it. To tailor effective solutions to the challenge, we need to understand the situations where over-indebtedness is most likely to exist and which borrowers are most at risk. To our knowledge, there are no academic studies that analyse which factors are related to overindebtedness in microfinance. It has not been tested which of the factors identified in consumer finance research could equally apply to the microfinance context. This paper analyses factors related to over-indebtedness in microfinance. Taking a customer protection perspective to enhance our understanding of the phenomenon, this paper contributes to the development of customer protection measures to combat over-indebtedness.
We work with a unique primary dataset from a survey among 531 microborrowers in Accra, Ghana. We use logistic regression analysis to identify how poverty, adverse shocks, loan returns and financial literacy relate to over-indebtedness. We detail the relationship of these factors to the individual sacrifices that borrowers experience. By means of ordered logit regressions, we shed light on the role that these factors play concerning how acceptable sacrifices are to borrowers and how frequently borrowers repeat specific sacrifices.
We find that poorer borrowers, in terms of income and assets, are more likely to be overindebted, as are borrowers who experience adverse economic shocks, who use their loans, at 2 least in part, for non-productive purposes, and whose investments into microenterprises produce low returns. A lack of debt-specific financial literacy also comes with a higher likelihood of being over-indebted, but surprisingly, the opposite is true for general financial literacy. The same factors that relate to over-indebtedness also relate to which sacrifices borrowers employ as coping strategies for their debt, to how acceptable sacrifices are to borrowers, and to how frequently borrowers repeat sacrifices. The correlations of borrower-level factors with over-indebtedness confirm prior expectations based on theory and on empirical research in non-microfinance environments, for what might be the causes of over-indebtedness. These related factors are therefore likely to be causes of over-indebtedness. Because measures against over-indebtedness should address the borrowers that are most at risk and would optimally address the causes of the over-indebtedness phenomenon, our findings have important implications for the development of measures against over-indebtedness. They indicate that the spectrum of measures of over-indebtedness may be broader than expected.
The next section reviews the literature for factors related to over-indebtedness. In the absence of longitudinal studies, these factors represent the best candidates for potential causes of overindebtedness. Section 3 describes our dataset and our econometric approach. Section 4 contains a presentation and discussion of our empirical findings. Concluding remarks and recommendations are provided in section 5.
Factors related to over-indebtedness
To develop measures against the problem of over-indebtedness, it is necessary to identify the most effective levers. These measures should address the cases with the highest risk for overindebtedness; optimally, they would address the main drivers of over-indebtedness. The former requires knowledge concerning which customers are most at risk of over-indebtedness, i.e., we need to identify borrower characteristics related to over-indebtedness. The latter requires knowledge about the causes of over-indebtedness. However, there are no panel data for dealing with the challenges of endogeneity and causal interactions. The best possible approximation of the causes of over-indebtedness is thus to depart from theory and our knowledge of the causes of over-indebtedness in consumer finance and empirically analyse factors that are related to over-indebtedness in the microfinance context. A statistically significant relationship in multivariate analysis that confirms theoretical expectations and 3 prior empirical findings is currently the best available indication that a factor might be a cause of over-indebtedness. 1 This section identifies the socio-demographic and economic borrower characteristics that are related to over-indebtedness according to the microfinance literature and consumer finance research. It also analyses business and loan-related factors and financial literacy, exploring the theory of what might be the causes of over-indebtedness. It develops four hypotheses for factors related to over-indebtedness in microfinance. We empirically test these hypotheses in section 4.
There is no consensus on a definition of personal over-indebtedness in the literature. From the viewpoint of risk management, delinquency or default are common indicators for overindebtedness. From the viewpoint of customer protection, these indicators represent only late stage consequences of over-indebtedness. Over-indebted borrowers often struggle significantly with their loans before they reach the stage of manifest repayment problems.
Following Schicks (in press), this paper therefore uses an over-indebtedness definition that takes the borrowers' experiences with debt into account: "A microfinance customer is overindebted if he/she is continuously struggling to meet repayment deadlines and structurally has to make unduly high sacrifices related to his/her loan obligations".
The empirical research analysed in this section works with a range of measurements of overindebtedness, problem debt, repayment problems, or high indebtedness. While the measurement is prone to influence empirical findings, factors that are related to any of these phenomena are also likely candidates for factors related to over-indebtedness according to the above sacrifice-based definition. This section therefore reviews factors that the literature identifies to be related to debt problems, independently of the exact measure of debt problems used in each study. The studies we review also vary according to their geography and cultural context, the type of debt products they include, and the type of borrowers they analyse. This paper is the first to test the transferability of their findings to a microfinance setting.
Socio-demographic factors
A borrower's risk of personal over-indebtedness varies with his/her socio-demographic background. For example, the borrower's age is a frequently studied characteristic in 1 See Schicks (in press) for a framework of the causes of over-indebtedness. 4 consumer finance research is age. Although evidence is mixed, in the UK and the US, younger people seem to have a higher risk of indebtedness (Bridges & Disney, 2004; Drentea & Lavrakas, 2000; Lea, Webley, & Levine, 1993; Livingstone & Lunt, 1992) . This is consistent with a life-cycle approach to borrowing that assumes consumption smoothing over an individual's life time with debts acquired at a young age based on expected future income (Friedman, 1957; Modigliani, 1980) . Vogelgesang (2003) confirm this finding in a microfinance-specific study in Bolivia. In two studies by Canner and Luckett (1991) and Tokunaga (1993) with subjects from the US, the age effect is not significant.
Another influence factor is the borrower's household situation. Livingstone and Lunt (1992) find that in the UK, having more children reduces risk, assuming that children create discipline in their parents. The common view is, however, that having many children and younger children is positively associated with debt risks (Canner & Luckett, 1991; Lea et al., 1993; Lea et al., 1995) . This may be because children augment the fixed expenses of a household, while at the same time reducing its income generating capacity. Except for Tokunaga (1993) , most studies find increased over-indebtedness among single adult households, particularly after a divorce (Bridges & Disney, 2004; Canner & Luckett, 1991; Del-Río & Young, 2005; Lea et al., 1993; Webley & Nyhus, 2001 ). The problem might be the household dependence on a single income, combined with lingering habits and expenses that, in divorce cases, were appropriate for a different economic situation. This finding holds in the microfinance study conducted in Bolivia by Vogelgesang (2003) . Webley and Nyhus (2001) get closest to actually establishing a causal relationship because their study uses a longitudinal approach based on panel data. Several UK studies find higher debt risk for renters as opposed to home owners (Bridges & Disney, 2004; Disney, Bridges, & Gathergood, 2008; Lea et al., 1995) , an effect that is not significant in the US-based multivariate analysis by Canner and Luckett (1991) . According to Del-Río and Young (2005) , Drentea and Lavrakas (2000) , and Disney, Bridges, and Gathergood (2008) , ill health is related to debt problems; however cause and effect are ambiguous. Finally, gender (Lea et al., 1993) and ethnicity (Del-Río & Young, 2005) have been correlated to indebtedness.
Concerning education, Bridges and Disney (2004) , Canner and Luckett (1991) and Tokunaga (1993) find a higher risk of debt when a borrower's level of education is low. According to Livingstone and Lunt (1992) the effect of education is not significant in the UK. Gonzalez (2008) confirms the relationship of low education to over-indebtedness in microfinance in 5 Bolivia. More educated households might have a better economic standing in general but may also be better able to make more advantageous financial decisions. The risk of overindebtedness could result from behavioural biases that make borrowers take on more debt than is reasonable. Humans do not make fully rational decisions, sometimes due to a lack of information, or due to a lack of cognitive abilities. They may be subject to temptations and over-value present benefits. Laibson (1997) explains this with the theory of hyperbolic discounting, where decision makers apply time-inconsistent discount rates. For example, in taking a loan, a borrower may give too much weight to the pleasure of receiving immediate cash and too little weight to the future burden of repayment. To a certain extent, a higher educational level may help borrowers deal with these biases.
Economic factors
The academic debate on economic factors influencing over-indebtedness focuses, most importantly, on income. Having a low income is a major cause of indebtedness in many consumer finance studies in the US and UK (Bridges & Disney, 2004; Disney et al., 2008; Lea et al., 1993; Lea et al., 1995; Livingstone & Lunt, 1992) . It is, however, not significant in the US studies by Canner and Luckett (1991) and Tokunaga (1993) . Livingstone and Lunt (1992) find that the absolute amount of borrowing among US households increases with income, but confirm that repayment difficulties mainly exist among low-income borrowers.
Earning a low income probably reduces a borrower's repayment capacity, due to a low absolute amount of cash inflow at a borrower's disposition, and due to a larger share of total income being bound for essential living expenses. In microfinance, Paxton, Graham, and Cameron (2000) find a higher risk for repayment problems among rural borrowers in Burkina Faso that could be related to their lower incomes. In contrast, in South Africa, Collins (2008) finds that indebtedness is negatively related to income only in urban areas.
Alternatively, income uncertainty can be a driver of debt problems (Webley & Nyhus, 2001 ).
If income is instable but the instalment schedule for a loan is fixed, borrowers may not have the means to serve their debt in low-income periods, even if their average annual income might be sufficient to deal with a given debt load. Moreover, an association between wealth levels and debt (Del-Río & Young, 2005; Disney et al., 2008) is confirmed by Sharma and Zeller (1997) and Godquin (2004) among microfinance borrowers in Bangladesh. The positive effect of wealth on a borrower's repayment capacity is likely to be most important for liquid assets, such as cash savings that could be used to reimburse a loan in periods with 6 insufficient income. Less liquid assets may still enhance repayment capacity if a borrower sells or pawns them. Wealthier borrowers are more likely to have assets to liquidate that they can spare without incurring significant sacrifice as a result. In terms of labour market status, being unemployed or in an instable or part-time position is related to higher debt in the UK (Lea et al., 1995) . This effect is probably related to that of a borrower's income and income volatility.
Aside from the economic background characteristics of a borrower, adverse shocks to the income or expenses of borrowers reduce their capacity to repay debt and can trigger a situation of over-indebtedness (Disney et al., 2008; Stone & Maury, 2006) . We define shocks as irregular events such as sudden expenses for emergencies, expected but irregular lump sum expenses (e.g., wedding ceremonies), or sudden impermanent drops in income (e.g., due to illness). While borrowers may be able to adapt to longer-term reductions in income by reducing their consumption or shifting their income generating capacity, they may not have the means or financial buffer to deal with sudden income reductions that occur unexpectedly.
Human beings tend to display habit persistence that prevents them from immediately adjusting their consumption in response to income cuts (Brown, 1952) . This effect is similar to but distinct from that of generally volatile incomes. Similarly, adverse shocks to a borrower's expenses, such as large lump sums required either for expected events (e.g., school fees, marriages), or unexpected shocks (e.g., medical expenses, funerals), may consume most of a borrower's income in a given period and may not leave sufficient cash flow for debt repayment. Bouquet, Wampfler, Ralison, and Roesch (2007) find that the main reasons for credit problems mentioned by microborrowers in Madagascar are sudden increases in expenses or loss of income.
There are two main factors that emerge from this analysis: material poverty and adverse economic shocks. The findings discussed above suggest that over-indebtedness is related to material poverty in the form of low incomes and low asset ownership. They also indicate a higher risk of over-indebtedness following unexpected reductions in income or sudden lump sum expenses. We test two hypotheses relating to economic factors to confirm that both a borrower's general economic situation and sudden events that negatively affect their income and expenses are independently related to over-indebtedness. We test the influence of material poverty separately for income and for asset ownership. We test the influence of the following adverse economic events: unexpected shocks to expenses, lump sums such as school fees that are expected but nevertheless difficult to manage, and shocks to income. 
Business and loan-related factors
Finally, as microcredit was originally (and often still is) primarily directed towards productive purposes, i.e., the investment into microenterprises, low returns on this investment can increase the difficulties of borrowers coping with their debt (Gonzalez, 2008; Hulme, 2007) .
The return on an investment (ROI) depends on the specific investment, for example the borrower's choice of what to invest in, the market conditions, the general condition of the microenterprise, the borrower's entrepreneurial skill and other factors (de Mel, McKenzie, & Woodruff, 2008) . Additionally, the ROI may depend on the general characteristics of the enterprise, for example on its sector of activity. Some sectors of activity may have higher returns than others, i.e., they may be more profitable. This may result, for example, from a relaxed competitive situation in a sector, due to entry barriers that allow businesses to exploit monopoly rents. Sectors of activity might also differ in the timing of cash flows. A loan for working capital used to restock a small shop with a quick turn over generates returns faster than a loan invested in agriculture where farmers must wait until harvest to generate returns. 8 A highly profitable investment does not increase a microborrower's repayment capacity if returns only materialise after the end of the instalment schedule. Schreiner (2004) finds manufacturers in Bolivia to be nearly twice as risky borrowers as traders, i.e., they are less likely to repay their loans. This might be a result of the profitability of trading businesses, but it is also due to their faster turnover.
Furthermore, the ROI goes down if a borrower decides to use the loan (at least partially), for non-productive purposes. On the one hand, scholars increasingly argue for the benefits of microlending for consumption purposes and income smoothing (Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, & Ruthven, 2009; Karlan & Zinman, 2009) . A loan that does not generate financial returns may, nevertheless, be very beneficial to a borrower, for example, in avoiding periods of hunger by financing food in a low-income period, or in avoiding a deterioration in health by financing medical expenses. On the other hand, non-productive loan use is considered a risk factor for repayment (Gonzalez, 2009; Vogelgesang, 2003) . Buying goods for immediate consumption does not create returns and thus does not help to repay a loan on time and without excessive sacrifice. In certain cases, it is difficult to distinguish which loan use is productive and which one is not (Collins, 2008) . A loan for medical expenses may avoid the loss of one's income generating capacity and may therefore have an indirect positive financial return. Nevertheless, the loan inflicts the cost of interest and fees on the borrower and does not create any extra repayment capacity compared to the base scenario that prevails without medical expenses and without the loan.
Finally, loan use is not the only loan-specific factor related to over-indebtedness. The characteristics of a loan, such as the amount of interest charged, the instalment schedule, and the lending policies of MFIs, also influence a borrower's ability to repay their debt. In this paper's sample population in Ghana, these factors vary mainly on the institutional level, i.e., between MFIs, rather than from one borrower to the other. Where they vary within MFIs, it is mainly between group borrowers and individual borrowers. As a result, this paper does not go into the detail of loan and lender influences on the risk of over-indebtedness. Instead, along with the most common borrower level controls for loan characteristics, the empirical analysis will control for general loan characteristics on the MFI level and for the lending methodology (i.e., group or individual).
We test the hypothesis that microborrowers' over-indebtedness is related to the return on investment on their loans. We test if there is an independent influence of the borrower's 9 decision about loan use (i.e., at least partially for consumption or exclusively for productive purposes) and of the returns on investing the loan into a productive activity. 
Financial literacy
More specifically than education, a borrower's financial literacy, his understanding of financial products, may be related to over-indebtedness. Empirical research indicates that the cognitive abilities of an average individual are low compared to the complexity of financial decisions. Tiwari, Khandelwal, and Ramji (2008) find that microfinance clients in India think about their loans in terms of how much they owe on a weekly basis but know very little about their interest rate or total interest expenses. This is in line with the theory of mental accounting (Thaler, 1985) , which shows that individuals think about their financial decisions in terms of budgets for various mental expense categories but not in terms of interest rates and the time value of money. Similarly, Atkinson, McKay, Kempson, and Collard (2006) provide empirical support from the UK for people making poorly informed financial choices, by for example not reading the terms and conditions of contracts and by not comparing providers. Lusardi and Tufano (2009) discover strikingly low levels of debt literacy across the U.S. population, for example serious difficulty in grasping percentages. Those who are less debt literate bear a disproportionally large share of avoidable costs (e.g., late fees). They are also more likely to be over-indebted. Similarly, studies by Paxton, Graham, and Cameron (2000) and Schreiner (2004) in Burkina Faso and Bolivia show that a lack of borrower training and experience with past loans is related to a lower payment performance. This paper therefore tests the hypothesis that financial literacy is negatively related to microborrowers' over-indebtedness risk. The more borrowers understand loans, the better borrowing decisions they can make and the less likely they are to take on debt beyond their means.
H4: Borrowers with a higher level of financial literacy are less likely to be overindebted.
H4a: A borrower's numeracy is negatively related to his risk of over-indebtedness.
H4b: A borrower's general financial literacy is negatively related to his risk of overindebtedness.
H4c: A borrower's debt literacy is negatively related to his risk of over-indebtedness.
Data and econometric framework
This paper is based on a unique primary database from Accra, Ghana. In cooperation with the Independent Evaluation Department of the German development bank KfW and with the Smart Campaign hosted by ACCION International, we conducted 531 structured interviews among microfinance borrowers 2 at the end of 2010. The interviews were anonymous. Five of Ghana's leading microfinance institutions, ProCredit Ghana, Opportunity International Ghana, Sinapi Aba Trust, EB-ACCION and Advans Ghana contributed to this random sample of microborrowers. They account for 83% of Ghana's microborrowers as reported to the MIX Market 3 in 2010 and for 95% of Ghana's gross microloan portfolio. We oversampled delinquent customers as they were likely to augment the number of over-indebted respondents in the sample and would allow for more variation in the over-indebted subgroup. 4 We corrected for both oversampling and response rates with sample weights for a borrower's lending institutions, a borrower's delinquency status, and the lending methodology of the borrower's main loan. There was no need to correct for gender.
Respondents reported details on all of their outstanding formal or informal loans at the time of the interview, including the purpose for which they used the loans and their subjective categorisation of return on their investment. Because borrowers would not be able to indicate the ROI in quantitative terms, they could choose from three categories of returns: the first indicating that the respondent did not permanently increase his/her earnings due to the investment; the second indicating that earnings increased but not enough or not stable enough 11 to cover the instalments on the loan; and the third indicating that, on a regular basis, the borrower earned significantly more income due to the investment or productive activity financed with the loan. A fourth category captures the few loans (3% of our sample) that have no productive component at all. Although a subjective measurement of returns is much less precise than a quantitative percentage, the relatively broad categories and their verbal description are tuned to avoiding endogeneity, i.e. a respondent will not indicate lower returns because of being over-indebted. A borrower can report positive returns even if he is overindebted, if, for example, his repayment difficulties are related to adverse shocks rather than to low returns (23% of the over-indebted in table 2 categorise ROI as a permanent and significant increase in income). Or a borrower who repaid his loan without problems can report having experienced no (12% of borrowers who are not over-indebted) or too little increases in income (36% of borrowers who are not over-indebted). These borrowers may have had sufficient other resources at their disposal to not need the loan returns for investment. Our measurement of returns therefore focuses on the impact of returns on overindebtedness.
Moreover, respondents reported their socio-demographic, economic and business characteristics, and took a test of financial literacy. Appendix 1 contains the financial literacy questions based on Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) and Lusardi and Tufano (2009) . In consultation with local MFI staff and after a pilot of the questionnaire, the questions were adapted to the local environment and to the aptitude of Ghanaian low-income borrowers. For our measurement of over-indebtedness, respondents listed all sacrifices that they experienced related to their loans over the course of one year (see Appendix 2 for the list of sacrifices).
They indicated how many times they experienced each of the sacrifices ("Once in past year", "1-3 times in past year", ">3 times but not often", or "Frequently in past year") 5 and weighted their sacrifices according to their subjective judgment of how acceptable the experience was to them ("Easily acceptable", "Only just acceptable", "Not really acceptable", or "Not acceptable"). The first two categories summarise as "acceptable", and the latter as "unacceptable" or "not acceptable".
Based on this data on sacrifices, we can apply the sacrifice-based over-indebtedness definition and determine which borrowers are over-indebted in our sample. Respondents are overindebted if they indicate that they struggle to repay their loans on time, make unacceptable sacrifices related to their loans, and that their experiences of unacceptable sacrifices are structural. To determine if sacrifices are a sign of structural debt problems, we only consider borrowers who experience a minimum of three repeated, unacceptable sacrifices as overindebted. Only the structural one-off sacrifices, asset seizures, unacceptable loan recycling, and selling or pawning assets to be able to repay a loan, do not need to be repeat experiences. 6 As a robustness check, we introduce a threshold free measurement of a borrower's level of sacrifice. We construct a score that increases from zero to 72 for each sacrifice that a borrower makes. Sacrifices weigh more the less they are acceptable (one to four points) and the more frequently they occur (one to four points). This score does not allow us to determine which factors are related to over-indebtedness, as it does not distinguish between low, acceptable levels of sacrifice, and sacrifices at the level of over-indebtedness. However, if empirical results for factors related to over-indebtedness and to the general score of sacrifices are similar, this proves that our findings are not sensitive to the exact threshold of our binary over-indebtedness measurement.
<insert table 1 about here> Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the sample characteristics. 7 On average, the borrowers in our sample are representative of "typical microborrowers". They are mostly female (72%) who are poor but economically active and not living in extreme poverty. They are predominantly self-employed (98%) and are mainly traders (81%). The sample is almost evenly split between the group lending methodology (48%) and the individual lending methodology (52%), with some MFIs following only one or the other model, and some offering both types of lending products. According to borrowers' reports, almost all loans are, at least in part, used for productive purposes (97%), although many of them have not gone exclusively into a microenterprise but have also been used for consumption purposes (30%).
<insert table 2 about here>
The descriptive statistics in table 1 and 2 provide a first indication of which factors are related to over-indebtedness. Using t-tests for the difference in means between the over-indebted group and the borrowers who are not over-indebted, we find significant differences in terms of a borrower's income and assets, as well as adverse shocks to income. Similarly, all three dimensions of financial literacy have significantly different means among the over-indebted.
In contrast to income shocks, the amount of adverse shocks a borrower has experienced to his/her expenses is not significantly different between groups. Using a chi-squared test on our categorical variables, we find a significant correlation between the returns on investment that a borrower reports and his over-indebtedness status. There is no significant relationship between over-indebtedness status and loan use. However, neither t-tests nor the chi-squared contingency analysis can control for the influence of other variables on over-indebtedness.
We therefore regress our indicators of financial literacy, poverty, adverse economic shocks and loan returns on our binary over-indebtedness measurement in a multinomial logistical regression. As identified in section 2, we control for the socio-demographic and economic characteristics of borrowers and the business-and loan-related factors that may be related to over-indebtedness.
For each respondent, i, Oi is a dummy variable that takes the value one for a borrower who is over-indebted and zero otherwise. LNi is the result of the literacy test specific to numeracy, LNi is the result for general financial literacy related to savings accounts and inflation, and
LDi denotes the result of the debt-specific literacy test. I represents income, and A total assets.
Regarding adverse shocks, we distinguish unexpected expense shocks (SUEi), expected large lump sum shocks (SEEi) and adverse shocks to income (SIi). For returns, CUi stands for at least a portion of the loan being used for consumption and ROIi for the return on investment.
Xi is a vector of controls for socio-demographic characteristics that include the following categories: gender, age, ethnic background, marital status, the number of children, household size, housing type, employment status, a subjective categorical measurement of health problems and a borrower's level of education. 8 Yi is a vector of the economic characteristics, income volatility and amount of savings owned, as well as the key loan characteristics of the number of lenders to whom a borrower is indebted, the total amount of debt disbursed on current outstanding loans, the average (Greenwald, 1983; Moulton, 1990 ).
We employ a five-step estimation procedure for the logistic regression model suggested above. The first model serves as a basic benchmark for analysis. It includes all potential variables and controls but does not yet take common variance effects into account. We report odds ratios and White's heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (White, 1980) . In model (2) we add the correction for common variance components on the lender level. Given that our controls describe borrowers' individual situations quite comprehensively, there is the potential for interactions between some of our explanatory variables. We expect women to differ from men in how they use microloans (Agier, Guérin, & Szafarz, 2012; D'Espallier, Guérin, & Mersland, 2011) . Women might be more likely to use loans for household purposes rather than for productive investments (Garikipati, 2008) . We also expect that lending methodology may have an effect on loan use, because the pressure to invest a loan into a microenterprise as well as the extent to which loan use is monitored are likely to be higher in the group lending model (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999) . Model (3) therefore expands on model 2 by adding interaction terms for gender with loan use and for lending methodology with loan use. 9 Model (4) drops all controls that were not significant in the previous models, eliminating the noise that potential non-significant variables may have created. This parsimonious model represents our main model and is the basis for all consecutive analyses. Model (5) shows the effects of running our regression on the main hypotheses only, excluding control variables.
As a robustness check, we repeat the same regressions (1) to (5) with a different dependent variable that does not depend on our over-indebtedness definition and on the specific threshold applied in our measurement of over-indebtedness. We regress the factors that are likely to be related to over-indebtedness on the 72-point sacrifice score, as described earlier in this section. The results are unlikely to be exactly the same, given that different factors may be related to minor sacrifices than to severe ones. Also, factors that explain if a borrower is over-indebted may not explain small variations in the intensity of his struggles. Nevertheless, we expect the robustness check to deliver roughly similar results to those obtained from the main regression. It thus confirms that our findings are not specific to the details of the overindebtedness measurement but are capable of explaining borrower sacrifices in general.
To understand the relationship of poverty, adverse shocks, loan returns and financial literacy to sacrifices in more detail, we run additional regressions that consider the sacrifices underlying over-indebtedness separately. We run our main parsimonious model (4) This analysis allows us to understand the mechanisms through which poverty, adverse shocks, loan returns and financial literacy relate to over-indebtedness; how factors relate to the severity of sacrifices; which factors increase the repetition of sacrifices; and which factors are related to specific sacrifices rather than to others. It provides relevant insights for developing policy implications for microfinance and identifying the best responses to address the risk of over-indebtedness in microfinance. Aside from the general effects of poverty in terms of low income and little asset ownership, the analysis confirms that adverse economic shocks have an independent effect on overindebtedness (H2). While the evidence is not strong for unexpected shocks to a borrower's expenses (for example funerals or broken assets that have to be replaced) (H2a), expected
Results and discussion
Main regressions
shocks to expenses such as lump sum expenses for school fees or marriages are related to over-indebtedness with a 1% significance level (H2b). Surprisingly expected lump sums appear to be more important than unexpected shocks. For each marginal Cedi of expected shock, the likelihood of over-indebtedness increases by 0.1%. The data are even stronger regarding shocks to a borrower's income (H2c). Leaving out the benchmark regression that
had not yet taken the common variance effects on the MFI level into account, all models consistently display coefficients for income shocks that are significant at the 1%-level.
Similar to expense shocks, a marginal increase in income shocks increases the risk of overindebtedness by 0.1%.
These regressions also relate returns of investment (H3) to over-indebtedness. They confirm that both loan use (H3a) and the returns on an investment made with the loan (H3b) are related to over-indebtedness, with significance levels at 1%. 10 The results are slightly less consistent for loan use, but the main model shows that for women (when gender is at its reference value of 0 and there is no effect of the interaction term), the likelihood of being 10 There is no significant multicollinearity between partial non-productive loan use and ROI.
over-indebted increases by 12.2% for those who used a loan, at least in part, for a nonproductive purpose. This effect is independent of our measurement of investment returns, potentially because the classification of returns into four categories does not cover the full amount of variation of returns and because having to use debt for non-productive purposes might indicate a lower ex-ante capacity to cover debt instalments that cannot be covered by investment returns from other sources. It could also relate to the reverse effect of overindebtedness increasing the risk that an individual needs to use part of their loan for nonproductive purposes. Moreover, there is a significant interaction effect between loan use and gender. Regarding returns on investments, loan returns that are not sufficient to cover instalments come with a 15.4% higher likelihood of being over-indebted compared to productive loan uses that produce permanent earnings increases at a level sufficient to repay the loan. If there are only impermanent increases in earnings from the productive loan use, this factor increases to 36.5%, and when no returns are possible (i.e., no investment, not even in part) it increases to 42.9%. 11
For our first hypothesis, the regressions confirm H4c that borrowers with higher debt-specific financial literacy are less likely to be over-indebted. Marginal effects indicate that an infinitesimally small increase of a borrower's score in our debt literacy test corresponds to a 0.2% lower likelihood of over-indebtedness. The result is significant at a 1%-level.
Contradicting our prior expectations, the opposite is true for general financial literacy (H4b):
while the effect is small, an increase in general financial literacy corresponds to a higher risk of over-indebtedness. Mere numeracy (H4a), the ability to perform simple mathematical operations, is not related to over-indebtedness.
In sum, we find strong confirmation for our hypotheses with the expected signs, except for general financial literacy, for which the relationship to over-indebtedness is positive, and except for numeracy, which has no relationship to over-indebtedness. Concerning asset ownership and unexpected shocks to expenses, the results are not always consistent across models. As Appendix 3 shows, many of our control variables for socio-demographics, economic situation and lenders are also significant. Interestingly, a borrower's level of education is not significant, nor is his amount of savings, his debt amount, the number of MFIs he borrows from, or the lending methodology (group/individual).
While a cross-sectional dataset without an experimental design does not allow for an analysis of causality, for most of the hypotheses tested, there is likely to be a causal chain of the factors impacting over-indebtedness. Over the short time horizon of the study, it is more likely that low income has contributed to over-indebtedness than that income has gone down due to over-indebtedness. Adverse economic shocks have not occurred due to overindebtedness but are much more likely to have triggered it. The returns on the productive activity financed with the loan are unlikely to be low because a borrower is over-indebted but it is probable that low returns have made repayment more difficult and thus contributed to over-indebtedness. Debt literacy has not changed when over-indebtedness hit, but has probably influenced a borrowers choices in taking on debt. More debt literate individuals seem to make smarter borrowing choices. Further research is required to confirm and analyse the opposing finding for general financial literacy. In terms of assets and loan use, the evidence for causality is less clear. Over-indebtedness might be caused by a lack of assets but might also reduce a borrower's assets (for example, in the case of a seizure or asset sales to repay a debt). Similarly, consumption loan use can create over-indebtedness but if there is an effect that is independent of the ROI this may also be due to a higher likelihood that an overindebted borrower needs to take on debt for non-productive purposes.
Robustness check
We test the robustness of our findings by replacing the over-indebtedness measure with a general threshold-free score of borrower sacrifices; table 5, column (4) displays the main model. The same results are obtained for income, but not for assets and unexpected expense shocks that were already weaker findings for to over-indebtedness. Out findings also hold true for the following factors: expected expense shocks and income shocks, loan use and the interaction of gender with loan use, ROI, debt literacy, and the lack of a relationship to numeracy. The opposite effect of general financial literacy is confirmed, although weakly.
Given that not all variation in borrower sacrifices is necessarily determined by the same factors as over-indebtedness, the robustness check provides confirmation for our main findings. They are not dependent on our specific measurement of over-indebtedness. 12
<insert table 5 about here> Further analyses
To deepen our understanding of how financial literacy, poverty, adverse shocks and loan returns are related to over-indebtedness, we run separate regressions of our main model (4) on each sacrifice to determine which of these factors are related to the incidence of each specific sacrifice. 13 This analysis is independent of the acceptability of a sacrifice; thus, not every sacrifice contributed to a borrower being over-indebted. The analysis allows for a refined approach to developing solutions to over-indebtedness. Table 6 indicates that income is related to all sacrifices except to increases in work efforts and shame. Potentially, the poorest borrowers might already exert their maximum possible work effort and are very accustomed to financial problems, making sacrifices less of a source of shame. In line with its over-all relationship to over-indebtedness, the relationship of income to the various sacrifices is typically negative. Asset ownership is related to exactly those sacrifices where income does not play a role. It prevents extra work and the depletion of savings and has a very small but positive impact on shame. When adverse shocks hit a borrower, the typical responses to unexpected expense shocks appear to delay postponing other expenses, including food costs.
Large, expected expenses, in contrast, allow for longer-term coping strategies, such as lining up extra work, using savings and selling assets. They come with a higher likelihood for shame for the borrowers, maybe because they are more foreseeable and solicit less pity from others.
When borrowers experience sudden reductions in income, they primarily react by taking on new debt, or by selling or pawning assets, and they tend to suffer from psychological stress.
Using one's loan, at least in part, for non-productive purposes is very significantly related to experiences of shame. This may be due to the borrower's bad conscience if he was supposed to fully invest the loan. At a 10% significance level, non-productive loan use is also positively related to psychological stress and, interestingly, to reductions in the education of the borrowers' children. Independent of loan use, the different levels of ROI are jointly related to all sacrifices, except for taking on new debt and experiencing threats. The reason for the former might be that new debt is more difficult to obtain with a business that is not running customer protection point of view it is a (reinforcing) consequence of over-indebtedness rather than an original influence factor. We therefore do not include this highly endogenous factor in our regressions on over-indebtedness. We did, however, test that doing so would not change our findings. Regarding the acceptability of sacrifices, table 7 shows that for the most common sacrifices, the factors related to over-indebtedness are not only related through a higher or lower likelihood of certain sacrifices occurring, but that they are also related to how acceptable different sacrifices are to the borrowers. 14 For example borrowers in more difficult economic situations might experience the same sacrifices more severely because they have no further buffer for e.g., reductions in consumption, or they may experience more severe forms of these sacrifices. At the same time they could experience some sacrifices as less severe because they are more used to financial difficulties. The data indicate that a lack of income and assets is positively related to the unacceptability of having to work harder, i.e., it reduces acceptability.
Expense shocks do not seem to change the acceptability of any of these common sacrifices.
Using a portion of a loan for a non-productive purpose equally reduces the acceptability of having to work harder to repay it, perhaps because productive loan use links directly to the expectation to also invest more time in the enterprise. A lack of returns on the investment 14 Of course cut-off values for the latent variable of acceptability vary significantly between the models.
reduces the acceptability of both extra work and postponed expenses in the household and business. Not having invested the loan at all however comes with a higher acceptability of postponing important expenses, potentially because there were no return expectations linked to the loan and the borrower was willing to postpone other expenses ex ante. In terms of financial literacy, general financial literacy seems related to a higher acceptability to postpone expenses and a lower acceptability to deplete one's savings. Increased debt literacy comes with a higher acceptability for extra work to repay the loan. Future research with larger sample sizes would need to increase the precision of these estimates and extend this analysis to encompass the less common sacrifices. Table 8 analyses how frequently borrowers repeat sacrifices. For those borrowers who have cut down on food consumption, increased work efforts, or depleted their savings to pay a loan instalment, poorer borrowers are likely to repeat these sacrifices more frequently than richer borrowers. In terms of reductions in food and savings, the same is true for borrowers who have experienced unexpected expense or income shocks. Loan use does not impact the frequency of the most common sacrifices. A lack of ROI is negatively related to the frequency of working harder and postponing expenses, i.e., these sacrifices are repeated less frequently.
<insert table 7 about here>
For financial literacy the picture is twofold: a higher score on the numeracy test comes with less repetition of sacrifices three and five. A higher score on general financial literacy seems to correspond to more frequent sacrificing of food and savings, and debt-specific literacy to more frequent food cuts and taking on extra work. The best way to understand these findings would be with qualitative research that can disentangle the reasons behind these effects. For example, literacy can be positively related to the frequency of some sacrifices because borrowers who understand loans better are better able to anticipate repayment challenges and thus identify the necessary coping strategies. At the same time, it can be negatively related to the frequency of other sacrifices because more literate borrowers may get into less severe repayment problems and thus be able to avoid the more severe sacrifice experiences.
<insert table 8 about here>
The analysis of how factors related to over-indebtedness relate to the frequency and acceptability of individual sacrifices is in its nascency, but it sheds some initial light on the complexity of factors related to over-indebtedness through the lens of customer protection.
Depending on the situation of the individual borrower and on the trigger for the debt problems, borrowers may experience the same sacrifices as more or less severe or experience 22 a more or less severe form of them. A borrower's poverty, adverse shocks, loan returns and financial literacy are also related to the question of how frequently borrowers experience specific sacrifices. This provides an indication of more prolonged problems overindebtedness. While it is too early to deduce clear policy recommendations, our analysis indicates that there may be a means of reducing the customer experience of over-indebtedness by addressing specific levers that reduce the duration of the sacrifices or that help borrowers make their situation more acceptable.
Conclusion and Implications
This paper analyses over-indebtedness from a perspective of customer protection.
Endangering both MFI sustainability and the social impact of microfinance, overindebtedness is currently one of the most important challenges in microfinance. Customer protection efforts are one of the industry's top priorities. Nevertheless, to date, overindebtedness, especially from the customers' perspective, remains highly underresearched.
Insights on factors related to over-indebtedness are urgently needed for the development of measures against this phenomenon.
This paper indicates that microborrowers are more likely to be over-indebted when they are living on lower incomes and with lower assets, and when they experience adverse economic shocks to their income and expenses. There are independent effects of over-indebtedness risk being higher for borrowers with low returns on the investment in their microenterprise and for borrowers who, in part, use their loans for non-productive purposes. Borrowers are more likely to be over-indebted when they lack the financial literacy to understand debt products.
General financial literacy seems to have an opposite effect, contradicting our expectations.
For mere numeracy, there is no statistically significant effect on over-indebtedness.
While cross-sectional regression cannot analyse causality, the factors we identify to be related to over-indebtedness are likely to be the causes of over-indebtedness. The relationships we identify confirm prior expectations concerning causality, and with the exception of asset ownership and loan use a reverse causal relationship is improbable. Based on a unique database from Ghana, this is the first research to confirm these relationships in a microfinance context. By identifying the relationships of factors to over-indebtedness that are likely candidates for causal influence factors, this paper provides an important contribution to our 23 understanding of over-indebtedness in microfinance and to the development of solutions to this major challenge for the industry.
We further deepen the analysis by breaking down how the above factors relate to the question of which sacrifices borrowers employ as coping strategies for their debt. Borrowers with different economic backgrounds, loan uses, and financial literacy respond to repayment difficulties in different ways. For example, when hit by unexpected shocks to their expenses, borrowers rather react with reductions in their food consumption and with postponing important other expenses, but they tend to employ longer-term coping strategies such as working harder, creating and using savings, and selling household or business assets when faced with lump sum expenses that are expected.
Moreover, this paper provides the first insights into the relationship of economic background, adverse shocks, loan returns and financial literacy to how acceptable the most common sacrifices are to borrowers and how frequently these sacrifices are repeated. For example, low investment returns on a loan are related to a lower acceptability of extra work and of postponing expenses, but having used a loan exclusively for non-productive purposes comes with a higher readiness to work harder to repay it. Regarding the repetition of specific sacrifices, borrowers who are faced with unexpected expenses or with income shocks, for example, sacrifice food and savings more frequently, while other sacrifices remain unaffected.
Our findings have important policy implications. The microfinance industry must identify ways to reduce over-indebtedness among its customers. From a customer protection point of view, it is important to not just reduce default but to reduce the suffering of customers from over-indebtedness, i.e., their sacrifices. Knowing that borrowers are more likely to be overindebted when they live on lower incomes and own fewer assets, MFIs might be able to reduce over-indebtedness by reducing credit to poorer borrowers, lending smaller amounts, or choosing to not lend to the poorest borrowers. 15 However, it is important to strike a good balance between the inclusion of the poor and avoiding over-indebtedness. Our findings
should not lead to a return to financial exclusion but excluding people who would experience harm from debt may be in their interest. 16
15 The control variables in the Appendix paint a more precise picture of the general socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the borrowers with the highest risk of over-indebtedness. They could contribute to some type of credit scoring but the same limitations apply that apply to the poverty criterion. 16 Note that our measurement of over-indebtedness does not imply causality. Microdebt may be the cause of the sacrifices but, even if respondents have listed the sacrifices that they experience as being related to their loan, the loans may also have Similarly, if adverse shocks to income and expenses represent a main cause of overindebtedness among microborrowers, MFIs should take the likelihood of adverse shocks into account when calculating repayment capacity. Adverse shocks are frequent among the target customers of MFIs and can turn an apparently healthy debt balance into a case of suffering and over-indebtedness. There is, again, reason for caution to avoid financial exclusion. At times, loans can be the best available tool for borrowers to cope with adverse economic shocks. Borrowers will be left with an unmanageable debt burden but may yet benefit, rather than having to face, for example, high medical expenses without access to credit. MFIs should therefore anticipate the occurrence of adverse shocks when determining creditworthiness and deciding on loan amounts and instalment schedules. They may, however, provide emergency loans, knowing that repayment might be difficult for the borrower. In certain cases, instead of reducing access to loans, more flexible instalment schedules could be the best solution to avoid over-indebtedness in borrowers who experience adverse shocks. This includes ex-ante flexibility of repayment conditions as much as ex-post flexibility with renegotiations and rescheduling (Hamp & Laureti, 2011) . Promoting savings instead of credit or providing insurance to borrowers could also go a long way toward preventing over-indebtedness.
There is an ongoing debate in microfinance concerning the industry's original requirement that loans be used productively. Our paper confirms that non-productive loan use increases the risk of over-indebtedness. However, these loans are, at times, worthwhile. Repaying a loan for emergency medical expenses is almost automatically more difficult than repaying a loan with good returns on investment. Nevertheless, the emergency loan may be beneficial to the borrower. Similarly, lower ROI on invested loans is related to higher over-indebtedness risks. Our paper confirms that ROI is often not sufficient for borrowers to repay their loans.
The high interest rates in microfinance have often been challenged for ethical reasons (Hudon, 2007 ), but at the same time, they have been justified with high returns on borrower's investments. While arguments concerning the high costs of providing microloans, the sustainability of MFIs and risks of exclusion due to interest rate caps remain valid, our findings challenge the assumption that high returns enable microborrowers to pay high interest rates. Nevertheless, the microenterprise investment may pay off in the long run, even if returns are not sufficient over the short instalment schedule of the typical microloan. Instead of reducing access to credit, the response might again be to better tailor products to helped the borrowers deal with an otherwise even more unbearable situation. Or the loan may have been useful but an adverse shock can have triggered over-indebtedness ex post.
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borrowers' needs and to develop instalment schedules appropriate to the cash flows of microenterprises.
Finally, our paper indicates that improving borrowers' financial literacy can reduce their risk of over-indebtedness. It shows, however, that financial literacy training needs to be specific to debt literacy to have the desired effect. Trainings in computational skills and general financial literacy would not be effective.
Moreover, in developing solutions to over-indebtedness, the industry should be aware of the complexity of the phenomenon. The factors analysed in this paper do not only relate to borrowers' risk of over-indebtedness, but they are equally related to which sacrifices borrowers experience, how frequently they repeat these sacrifices and how acceptable different sacrifices are to them. Further research needs to shed light on the details of these complex relationships for policy measures to effectively take into account the fact that specific measures address only specific sacrifice experiences among borrowers-and that there might be levers tailored to reducing the repetition of sacrifices or to increasing the acceptability of sacrifices to borrowers. This research points to a much broader spectrum of potential policy measures aimed at over-indebtedness, than just a focus on reducing delinquency and default would suggest.
These policy implications promise progress in the fight against over-indebtedness in microfinance but leave substantial room for ambiguity. It will remain a question of judgment, in specific situations, to what extent restricting credit for the poorest customers, being conservative in calculating repayment capacity, limiting loan use, flexibilising loan products, and offering financial literacy trainings is the correct response to over-indebtedness risks.
Extreme forms of these solutions could potentially eliminate over-indebtedness but would do so at the cost of excluding many customers from debt who could sincerely benefit, or (in the case of flexibility) at the cost of eroding repayment performance and putting the sustainability of institutions at risk. A certain level of over-indebtedness is probably unavoidable in any lending market. However, over-indebtedness measures should aim to reduce this level to a responsible minimum. 
